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The Psychology of Language. By J. A. Fodor, T. G. Bever, and M. F. Garrett. 
McGraw-Hill, New York, 1974, xviii + 537 pp., $18.00. 
This book is currently the major text in experimental psycholinguistics. 
Any card-carrying member of the clan must have read it by now; and even if 
he hasn't, he can probably tell you what he thinks of it. Which is not as 
outrageous as it sounds. Fodor, Bever, and Garrett have provided a detailed 
account of what surely has been the dominant view of our field over the past 
10 years or so. To review the book is to review the field. So, the issues are 
obvious: Are we doing psycholinguistics in a coherent way? Are our resutts 
sound and interesting? Are our methods defensible? Where do we go from 
here? 
First, a word or two about plot. This is essentially a book about the 
relationship between linguistic knowledge and linguistic behavior. As the 
authors (hereafter FBG) put it, "we shall be trying to work out part of a 
theory of how certain facets of verbal behavior are controlled by the speaker's 
knowledge of the grammatical structure of his language" (pp. 6-7). According 
to FBG, this problem has two parts: it requires, first, a specification of what 
the speaker knows about his language and, second, a theory of the psycho- 
logical mechanisms which apply this knowledge in the course of language use. 
FBG set out to solve these problems via the standard division of labor 
according to which linguistics supplies a hypothesis about linguistic knowledge 
and psycholinguistics attempts to determine how such knoMedge is employed. 
Within this framework, FBG begin by reviewing the "Hullian" psycho- 
linguistics of the 1950s. They find this earlier tradition wanting because, 
although it offered an account of language learning and use based on 
established psychological principles, it assumed an inadequate characterization 
of linguistic knowledge (roughly, phrase structure grammar plus structuralist 
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phonology). After reviewing the standard claims about the clumsiness of 
phrase structure, FBG nominate transformational grammar (1965 version) as a 
more nearly adequate description of linguistic knowledge and then turn to the 
major questions of the book: Does transformational grammar provide a 
psychologically accurate description of linguistic knowledge? If so, how is it 
employed? 
The answers are familiar (cf. Fodor and Garrett, 1966). They add 
together to form what might be called the weak theory of the psychological 
reality of transformational grammar. In effect, the weak theory says that the 
structural descriptions provided by the grammar are psychologically real, but 
the rules used to generate those structures are not. In support, FBG marshal 
the results of a small army of experiments which appear to show that 
numerous kinds of experimentally obtained linguistic behaviors correlate with 
properties of both the deep and surface phrase markers but that comparable 
behavioral measures fail to yield correlations between linguistic behavior and 
properties of transformational derivations. Accordingly, FBG conclude that 
the structural descriptions supplied by the grammar provide a psychologically 
accurate account of what the language user knows about the structure of the 
sentences in his language. However, they also conclude that the rules used to 
generate the structural descriptions are not directly involved in the application 
of this knowledge. According to the terms of this hypothesis, structural 
descriptions are directly realized during language use: the comprehension of a 
sentence involves the internal recovery of its structural description; the 
production of a sentence involves the internal assembly of a surface form with 
a structural description appropriate to the speaker's intended message. Thus 
both comprehension and production are viewed as psychological processes 
which relate sentences and structural descriptions. Since the grammar provides 
an abstract description of the relation between sentences and structural 
descriptions, it places a strong constraint upon psychological models of 
comprehension and production by specifying their input and output. But the 
grammar does not further constrain the internal operations of these models. In 
this respect, FBG's position can be distinguished from an earlier and stronger 
theory of the psychological reality of transformational grammar according to 
which models of comprehension and production incorporate the grammar as a 
subcomponent and make direct use of the transformational rules in getting 
from a sentence to its structural description and back (Miller and Chomsky, 
1963). 
No one who knows the literature would doubt that FBG have given the 
stronger theory a proper burial. But what about the weak theory? Having 
lived with it awhile, I begin to wonder whether we should continue to believe 
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it. I also have my doubts about its effects on the field. And I question 
whether it provides an adequate theoretical basis for psycholinguistics. Let me 
explain. 
For openers: Is the weak theory true? To illustrate the issues involved, 
we can focus on one of the weak theory's major subclaims: that in the course 
of comprehending a sentence the listener determines its deep structure phrase 
marker, as specified by the grammar. This is a particularly critical claim 
because it is deep structure which is peculiar to the structural descriptions 
provided by transformational grammar and hence distinguishes these structural 
descriptions from those provided by other grammatical theories. So it is not 
surprising that a number of us have done experiments designed to discover 
whether deep structure is determined during comprehension. 
Before considering those experiments, however, we need to take a 
minute to recall how the transformational linguist decides what a deep 
structure for a given sentence looks like. Simplifying a bit, there appear to be 
three main considerations: First, the deep structure should display the basic 
grammatical relations in a uniform way (e.g., the logical subject will always 
appear as the NP immediately dominated by S). Second, the deep structure 
should provide the syntactic information necessary for lexical insertion. Third, 
and most important for this discussion, the deep structure should be 
configured in such a way as to simplify the operation of the transformational 
rules which map deep structures onto surface forms. So, for example, 
Rosenbaum (1967) argues that the deep structure sentoid underlying the 
parenthesized complement clause in sentence (1) below must be dominated by 
an NIP node in deep structure so that the passive transformation (among 
others) can apply to the sentoid as if it were a noun phrase in order to 
produce the passive sentence (2) in the ordinary way: 
1. Everyone knew (that Bill was an idiot). 
2. That Bill was an idiot was known by everyone. 
To take another example, Chomsky (1957) generates the tense and number 
marker to the left of all other verbal elements in deep structure, not to the 
right of the first verbal element as it appears in surface structure. Again the 
motivation for this placement is transformation: it permits a single transforma- 
tion (the famous rule of affix hopping) to apply generally to all verbal affixes 
in the derivation of the surface structure of the English verb. 
Why bring all this up? Put somewhat simply, the point is this: why 
should we believe that deep structure phrase markers are determined during 
comprehension, when the characteristics of deep structure are partially 
selected just in order to simplify the operation of the transformational rules, 
264 Book Reviews 
which themselves lack psychological reality? So far as I can see, there is no 
compelling reason to adhere to such a belief. One can search in vain through 
the deep structure experiments which FBG review without finding any which 
test the psychological reality of  a transformationally motivated aspect of  deep 
structure. But these are the crucial tests. Experiments which assess the 
psychological reality o f  externally motivated aspects of  deep structures are 
inconclusive. For example, suppose an experiment designed to assess the 
psychological reality of  the basic grammatical relations yields positive results. 
This may indicate that the listener determines the basic grammatical relations 
during sentence comprehension, but it does not require the conclusion that he 
has done so by means of  recovering deep structure. Deep structure is only one 
of  many ways o f  displaying the basic grammatical relations. To demonstrate 
the psychological reality of  deep structure, we need to assess its unique 
features. And, in general, the unique features of  deep structure are just those 
which are motivated transformationally. 1 To date, such features of  deep 
structure have neither been tested directly nor been supported indirectly by 
positive results on tests of  transformational reality. Therefore, although it may 
be true that some of  the information displayed in deep structure is deter- 
mined during comprehension, it has not yet  been shown that the complete 
deep structure is determined. Moreover, the failure to find experimental 
evidence for the psychological reality of  the transformational rules makes it 
quite unlikely that such evidence will be forthcoming. 
Unless, of  course, transformational rules have claim to a psychological 
reality of  some other kind. FBG imagine just such a possibility. The argument 
goes this way: In the course of  writing transformational grammars, linguists 
have discovered certain constraints on the way in which transformations can 
be formulated and applied to phrase markers (for examples, see Ross, 1967). 
Violation of  these constraints produces grammatical monstrosities of  the most 
bizarre sort. Yet the constraints are difficult to state within the transforma- 
tional rules, and they also appear to apply in a general way across rules. As a 
lit may often be difficult to decide exactly which features of deep structure are unique. 
However, transformationally motivated features seem the best candidates for uniqueness 
since these features are introduced just in order to simplify the transformational rules, 
and transformational rules are unique to transformational grammar. The uniqueness of 
other features is usually arguable. For example, in 1968, I obtained a result which 
seemed to show that the effectiveness of a prompt word as an aid to sentence recall is 
an increasing function of the number of times that word appears in the deep tree of the 
memorized sentence (see Wanner, 1974). I argued that this result might demonstrate the 
behavioral effects of a unique feature of deep structure (number of appearances), and 
FBG echo this claim in discussing the result. However, at the time, I also noted that the 
effect might be due to correlated properties of semantic structure, and there is now 
some reason to believe that this is a better account of the effect (Anderson and Bower, 
1973). 
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result, linguists have tentatively elevated such constraints into the theory of 
transformational grammar. Once elevated, a constraint places a limitation upon 
what transformational rules can accomplish, and the limitation takes on the 
status of a hypothetical universal. That is, if the theory of transformational 
grammar provides a correct characterization of human language, then it should 
be possible to write a transformational grammar for any human language. But 
this will only be true in case there are no languages requiring rules 
which violate the constraints stated in the theory. In fact, the universality of  
many of the constraints so far proposed has yet to be very thoroughly tested 
across languages. And it is a bit of an embarrassment when the constraint 
proposed on the basis of research in English is violated by a language as 
closely related as Dutch (Comrie, 1977). Nevertheless, FBG accept the claim 
that some constraints on transformational rules are (or will prove to be) 
universal. They then proceed to worry that the existence of such universal 
constraints may prove embarrassing for the weak theory of the psychological 
reality of transformational grammar. As they see it, 
there are linguistic universals which serve precisely to constrain the form in 
which information is represented in grammars (i.e., the form of grammatical 
rules). The question is: If these universals do not also constrain the form in 
which linguistic information is represented in a sentence-processing system, 
how is their existence to be explained? Surely, if universals are true of 
anything, it must be of some psychologically real representation of a 
language. But what could such a representation be if it is not a part of the 
sentence encoding-decoding system? (pp. 369-370) 
FBG consider several possible answers, but their favorite is this: Suppose that 
the child comes equipped with a genetically determined language acquisition 
system which is biased toward the development of a transformational repre- 
sentation of linguistic structure. On this familiar assumption, the child learns a 
language by assembling a transformational grammar which is consistent with 
the growing mass of  linguistic data to which he is exposed. However, given the 
failure of the strong theory of transformational grammar, we can be certain 
that even if it is true that the child does acquire a transformational grammar, 
that cannot be all that he acquires. The child must also learn procedures for 
understanding and producing sentences. The core of FBG's proposal concerns 
the manner in which such procedures might be learned. Thus they speculate 
that such procedures might "be constructed by a simple and general algorithm 
from grammars that satisfy the universals and only from such grammars" (p. 
371). On this view, "the process of learning a (first) language involves 
internalizing the grammar and applying this algorithm to construct the 
corresponding [comprehension or production] procedure" (p. 371). 
This speculative account of  language acquisition has several obvious 
advantages for the weak theory of transformational reality. First, it provides a 
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psychological status for the grammar, namely, as that representation of  the 
language which is acquired initially by the child and from which all 
procedures underlying linguistic use must be derived. Second, it provides a 
way of  explaining the existence of  universal constraints on transformational 
rules by attributing them to innate biases in the language acquisition system. 
According to this position, a language which violates such constraints should 
not be learnable by a human 
the weak theory's claim that 
mational rules, are realized 
possible to imagine why the 
transformationally motivated 
child. Finally, this view provides a rationale for 
the structural descriptions, but not the transfor- 
during language use. For example, it is now 
deep structure of  a sentence, including even its 
aspects, might be determined during comprehen- 
sion: If  the child constructs a transformational grammar internally, then he 
will implicitly share the linguist's motivation for arranging deep structures in 
such a way as to simplify the operation of  the transformational rules. 
Moreover, if the child's comprehension procedures are derived algorithmically 
from the grammar in such a way as to preserve the mapping between 
sentences and structural descriptions provided by the grammar, then such a 
child must also develop into an adult who confirms the weak theory by 
realizing structural descriptions in a nontransformational manner during lan- 
guage use. 
But is there any evidence that children actually acquire language in this 
way? When, toward the very end of  their book, FBG get around to answering 
this question, they reach a conclusion which, if I understand it correctly, is in 
direct conflict with their own speculations about language acquisition: 
How plausible is it to view the grammar as psychologically real? . . .  In the 
case of language learning, [this issue] arises in the context of theories which 
hold that a standard transformational grammar is the output of the child's 
innate language acquisition mechanisms. 
We have argued that neither the empirical nor the theoretical basis for 
this view of language acquisition is secure. There exist no satisfactory 
models of a language acquisition device capable of inducing a grammar from 
a corpus, and there is very little unequivocal evidence that such an 
induction does, in fact, take place. (p. 502) 
There is, I think, every reason to accept this conclusion. It is based on an 
intelligent review of what is known about language acquisition. Among other 
things, FBG argue persuasively against the view that syntactic development 
can be construed as a gradual internal accumulation of  transformational rules, 
and I think it is fair to say that this conclusion is now generally accepted (cfi 
de Villiers and de Villiers, 1977; Maratsos, 1976). 
But such a conclusion should have a devastating impact upon the weak 
theory of  transformational reality. I f  there is no compelling evidence that the 
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child internalizes a transformational grammar in the course of acquiring 
language, then there is no longer any reason to believe that either sentence 
comprehension or production should involve the realization of the complete 
structural descriptions provided by a transformational grammar. In effect, this 
conclusion knocks the last leg out from under the weak theory of transforma- 
tional reality. Recall the state of the evidence. The weak theory escapes the 
fate of the strong theory by postulating that the structural descriptions, but 
not the transformational rules, are realized during language use. But, although 
there is evidence for the psychological reality of some aspects of structural 
descriptions, there is no evidence for the psychological reality of the unique, 
transformationally motivated aspects of structural descriptions. Nor can the 
weak theory provide any explanation of why transformationally motivated 
aspects of structural descriptions should be realized during language use unless 
the weak theory adopts an account of language acquisition in which the 
procedures underlying language use are derived from a previously internalized 
transformational grammar. But by FBG's own account, there is no compelling 
evidence that such an internalization takes place. 
It is puzzling that FBG do not appear to be upset by their own 
conclusions about language acquisition. Perhaps they take the evidence from 
child speech lightly. They might, for example, invoke the competence-per- 
formance distinction. Thus the child might be internalizing a transformational 
grammar, but the structure of his utterances might not show it if those 
utterances were controlled by performance procedures derived from, but only 
indirectly related to, the internalized grammar. This line of argument is 
plausible, but perilous, since it comes close to claiming that the internalization 
of a transformational grammar will proceed without any observable trace. In 
this case, however, the whole appeal to language acquisition is without 
empirical content, and the only empirical claim left to the weak theory is that 
the structural descriptions specified by the grammar are realized during 
language use. But now we have come full circle; for, as we have seen, tbe 
crucial aspects of this last claim have never been tested. 
Then again, perhaps there is another reason why FBG are not disturbed 
by the language acquisition data. Perhaps they feel that the evidence for the 
existence of universal constraints on transformation is enough to force the 
conclusion that transformational grammar must be internalized in some way 
during language acquisition, despite the scarcity of any other confirming 
evidence. 2 But I do not find this view compelling. Suppose we assume, before 
all the evidence is in, that there are some constraints on transformations 
2A careful reading of pp. 510-513 may support the guess that FBG do, in fact, hold this 
view. 
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which will prove to be universal. Even given this assumption, we need not 
conclude for the psychological reality of transformational grammar. For it is 
hard to imagine a constraint on transformations which cannot be restated as a 
constraint on surface structures. Once restated, possible explanations can be 
sought in terms of constraints on nontransformational representations of  
linguistic knowledge, or in terms of the cognitive limitations of the processing 
systems involved in determining surface structure. In any event, the fact that a 
universal property of linguistic structure can be stated as a constraint on 
transformations does not, so far as I can see, require us to conclude for the 
universal internalization of transformational grammar. 
So what is the upshot? Just this: Despite FBG's substantial and 
sophisticated arguments for the weak theory of transformational reality, I can 
find no conclusive evidence for the theory in their book. Certainly some of 
the properties of structural descriptions have been shown to correlate with 
some aspects of linguistic behavior. But none of the unique, transforma- 
tionally motivated aspects of such structures has been either directly or 
indirectly shown to have psychological reality. Therefore, so far as I can see, 
there is no conclusive reason to accept FBG's claim that the structural 
descriptions supplied by transformational grammar provide a constraint on the 
input or output of psychologically adequate models of comprehension or 
production. 
This conclusion, negative as it may be, is important. The weak theory of 
transformational reality has had the effect of preserving what might be called 
derivative psycholinguistics. Basic to this brand of psycholinguistics is the 
attempt to derive psychological theories of linguistic performance from 
linguistic theories of language structure. 3 The clearest cases of  derivative 
psycholinguistics are found among the early performance models which 
literally incorporated the grammar as a proper part. In rejecting such models, 
and the strong theory of transformational reality on which they were based, 
FBG have taken a long step away from a strictly derivative psycholinguistics. 
The question we must now face is whether this step has been long enough. 
By upholding the weak theory of transformational reality, FBG pre- 
serve a partially derivative psycholinguistics, one in which the input and 
output of performance models are still derived from the grammar. If the weak 
theory is correct, it would admittedly provide important benefits for psycho- 
linguistics. It would mean that a large part of the work of building 
3Notice the resemblance between the research program characteristic of derivative 
psycholinguistics and FBG's speculative version of language acquisition in which the 
child derives performance procedures from a previously internalized grammar. It is 
difficult to resist the observation that derivative psycholinguistics may have fashioned a 
theory of the child in its own image. 
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performance 'models has already been accomplished by linguistics. However, if 
the weak theory is incorrect, then the consequences for any program of  
research based on it must surely be disastrous for psycholinguistics. For if 
psycholinguists sign away the deed to the input and output of  their 
performance models, and if the linguistic characterization of  input and output  
proves inaccurate, then psycholinguistic research would be condemned to a 
fruitless search for a psychologically real performance mechanism which 
implements an input-output  relation which does not exist. 
To be fair, it appears that FBG also shrink from this abyss. Alluding to 
the continuing disputes within linguistics about the degree of  "abstractness" 
appropriate to deep structure, FBG make the following remark on their 
concluding pages: 
although the hypothesis that levels of grammatical description correspond 
closely to psychologically real levels of encoding has thus far often been 
vindicated, it cannot be relied upon indefinitely. Even as a source of 
information about the entities which populate descriptive levels, the stand- 
ard techniques of syntactic analysis may finally be running dry. We have 
seen that the kinds of constraints that have thus far been brought to bear 
within syntax seem to be compatible with a variety of assumptions about 
the degree of abstractness of deep structure. This clearly suggests that the 
constraints need to be tightened. Since the adequacy of a grammar depends 
on the psychological reality of the structural descriptions it postulates, it 
may well be that only direct experimentation on psychological reality ~11 
ultimately chose between competing syntactic theories. (p. 512) 
Here FBG finally reject the derivative psycholinguistic program. It is 
surely a sensible move, but it may also be the last straw for the weak theory. 
Ten years o f  research have failed to produce either a conclusive empirical case 
or a coherent theoretical formulation. In addition, the linguistic certainties 
upon which the weak theory is founded appear to have dissolved. So, perhaps 
it is time to change the way we are doing psycholinguistics. Perhaps we 
already have. 
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Some Aspects of Communicative Competence and Their Implications for 
Language Acquisition. By Tom Van Der Geest. Van Gorcum, Amster- 
dam, 1975 (no price indicated). 
Interest in questions of communicative competence in the last decade can 
be traced to the work of Hymes (1972). Many issues have been raised as 
the result of his pioneering work; Van Der Geest's (VDG) recent book Some 
Aspects o f  Communicative Competence. . .  (CC) is an attempt to address 
some of these issues. The book is divided into two parts. The first details 
exemplary phenomena the author argues should be included in a theory of 
communicative competence-stress, intonation, topic and comment, ellipsis, 
and language functions. The second and far shorter part will be of great 
interest to those working in the field of language acquisition. This section 
examines implications of the theoretical considerations in Part I for early child 
language development, from the single-word stage to multiword utterances 
during the third year. 
The author's articulated purpose for writing this book was to raise a set 
of issues that require consideration of linguistic phenomena that encompass 
intrasentential relations: "to present a provisional framework for the descrip- 
tion of utterances in terms of communicative appropriateness" (p. i). The 
volume suffers not so much from the heterogeneity the author fears but from 
overambitiousness. A more limited range of considerations would likely have 
afforded the author greater opportunity for integration. Nevertheless, CC does 
offer the reader important insights into aspects of communicative competence. 
Since there has been abundant interest in this area, particularly with respect 
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to its implications for theories of  language development,  this review will focus 
on Part II of  CC. 
In a volume that  seriously proposes to bring to bear a broad range of 
contextual  phenomena in developing a theory of  communicative competence,  
contextual  information is frequently absent. While VDG includes intonational  
and gestural information in single-word and two-word utterances, he fails to 
provide us with a description of the context  in which an utterance and its 
accompanying gesture and intonat ion occurred. For example,  we do not  know 
with whom the child was interacting, what utterances by the child and others 
surrounded the speech event, and so on. More contextual  information would 
have contr ibuted to making the data presented more intelligible and would 
have provided the reader with information sufficient to draw his own 
conclusions. 
A central theme in Part II of  CC is the author 's  criticism of  Bloom's 
theses in One Word at a Time (1973). With respect to single-word utterances,  
VDG argues: 
We will object against [sic] that children do not know grammar (whether it 
is grammatically or semantically specified) until their usage of two or 
multi-word sentences. It will be argued that intonational contours and 
accompanying bodily behavior give structure to the child's use of single 
words. Furthermore, it will be argued that the child's earliest productions 
can be provided with more complex underlying representations and that the 
mechanism accounting for ellipsis and stress. . ,  can deal with the tele- 
graphic method of speaking of the child. With respect to the transitional 
stage in which two single word sentences are used in an anticipated schema 
to cover one informational unit, it will be argued that this way of building 
up bigger units is not restricted to this particular stage. What we see here is 
an apparent mismatch between a greater semantic cognitive knowledge and a 
less developed set of realization rules from the side of the child. (p. 5) 
In Chapters VI-VIII  VDG presents four kinds of  evidence to argue in 
favor of  the view that  children's single-word utterances are sentences. Sentence 
is taken here to mean having semantic value greater than the referential 
meaning of  the lexical item. The arguments are 
1. The word order of  successive single-word utterances is the same as 
the word order might be i f  those words were produced in a 
syntactically more sophisticated utterance.  
2. Successive single-word utterances within an anticipated action schema 
form one informational  unit that  is therefore a unit  semantically if 
not  syntactically.  
3. Since children's early knowledge of  the relations between words is 
primari ly semantic rather than syntactic,  children do know more 
about  language than their single-word utterances might suggest. 
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4. Children's early single-word utterances are accompanied by con- 
trastive intonation and gestural patterns. Taken together, these 
sytematicities indicate that children mean more than they say. 
These arguments are examined individually below. 
1. VDG presents successive single-word utterances drawn from One 
Word at a Time in an attempt to demonstrate that successive single-word 
utterances exhibit the same order as fuller, syntactically more complex 
utterances. Contrary to VDG's claim, Allison Bloom produced successive 
single-word utterances that did not appear to be consistent with adult 
syntactic order or were at least open to alternative interpretation. 
a. (Allison, having eaten peach pieces that her fa- 
ther cut, picks up another piece of peach and holds 
it out to her father) 
b. (Allison, pretending to cook) 
Is the baby cooking? 




VDG also argues that since Allison's utterances with [wldz] exhibited 
regularities in word order, knowledge of syntax at some level can be 
attributed to the child at the single-word stage. This argument is problematic 
in that it confuses syntax with word order. While the child may have figured 
out some very general features of the word order of his native language, it is 
not necessarily the case that he knows about syntax. That is, syntax is more 
than word order; it is the order of words as determined by the particular 
types of relationships that obtain between the words as a function of the roles 
they assume (Bloom, 1973, pp. 37-38). In agreement with Bloom, it is argued 
here that one cannot attribute knowledge of syntax to the child based on 
regularities of word order in their successive single-word productions. In fact, 
there is doubt whether children's two- and three-word utterances reflect 
knowledge of syntactic relations. Bowerman argues "that the structural 
phenomena that motivate the description of adult speech in terms of syntactic 
phenomena are missing in child speech; hence, there is no clear evidence that 
children in fact have made these abstractions" (1976; see also Bowerman, 
1973a, b). 
2. VDG's second argument is based on the apparent relationship on 
informational grounds between successive single-word utterances. VDG shifts 
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from claiming primitive knoMedge of syntax to knowledge of semantic 
relations. "On semantic grounds one might decide that at least successions 
within an anticipated schema form just one informational unit (which is a 
speech event basically) that for the moment is not realized as a unit 
syntactically but semantically" (p. 194). While it is the case that successive 
single word utterances like Daddy/peach/cut/ (Bloom, 1973, p. 41) can be 
associated with the scene of Daddy cutting a peach, it is not necessarily the 
case that they represent one coherent informational unit. That the child may 
cognitively represent them as related events or an anticipated action schema is 
not the same. ~q~ile Bloom does not provide evidence against these utterances 
forming a coherent unit, VDG does not provide convincing evidence that they do. 
3. VDG claims that children know more than they say in the early 
stages of language acquisition, as borne out by their use of semantic 
processing strategies. While the use of semantic strategies in decoding active 
and passive sentences (Bever, 1970) is not denied, it has become increasingly 
evident that young children employ nonlinguistic strategies perhaps to an even 
greater degree. Clark (1971) and Keller-Cohen (1974)found that children use 
an order of mention strategy to process sentences with temporal connectives. 
Clark (t973) reports that children's early knowledge of in, on, and under is 
closely tied to perceptual features of the objects "and their possible relations 
in space, e.g., containers versus surfaces" (Clark, 1976, p. 17). These data 
argue for a more conservative interpretation of what young children know 
about language than VDG proposes. 
4. Clearly the most well-developed argument that VDG presents sup- 
porting the single-word utterance equals S position draws on intonational and 
gestur.al data from the speech of one child, Hester. In contrast to Bloom's 
report (1973), VDG reports systematic use of intonation at the single- and 
two-word stages. This finding is consistent with reports that prosodic develop- 
ment begins quite early (Kaplan, 1969, in Dore, 1975). 
VDG found that certain prosodic and gestural patterns were associated 










That Dxl § Imper + N, Dx2 § falling intonation, and Dxi + V never 
occurred was significant in establishing the contrastiveness of these classes. 
When all these features of a single-word utterance were viewed along 
with other properties of the context, VDG was able to establish a basic set of 
communicative intentions: 
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1. Pointing out existence. 
2. Questioning existence. 
3. Requesting possession. 
4. Requesting permission to act on. 
5. Asserting desire to possess. 
6. Asserting desire to act on. 
The author then translated these intentions + actual utterances produced into 
sentential representations. That is, through rich interpretation that combined 
actual lexical items produced in combination with gesture and intonation, 
VDG was able to interpret single-word utterances as sentential. 
The description of single-word utterances ultimately proposed combines 
some features of both Ingram (1971) and Antinucci and Parisi (1973). The 
model is similar to that of generative semantics. VDG's justification for his 
version of this model will not be discussed here. tn brief, however, an S 
(Utterance) can be described as consisting of a Sentence Qualifier (SQL) and a 
Proposition (P). The SQL contains information about the speaker's intentions 
(Ques, Imper) and about the speech event (assignment of speaker-hearer roles). 
P contains the Qualifier (Tns, Ned) + the Nucleus. The Nucleus contains 
information about the "State of Affairs," the referential meaning of the 
utterance. Gesture is formally incorporated into the description of the 
single-word utterance since it is viewed as part of the propositional structure 
of an utterance. Intonation is incorporated into the SQL since it provides 
information about the speaker's intentions. 
Even if one acknowledges the systematic use of gesture and intonation 
that VDG observed, there is still sufficient question about attributing under- 
lying semantic knowledge to the child. Such a position has been taken by 
Dote (1975). He proposes a speech act view of early word use. Words in his 
view are seen as rudimentary referring expressions, i.e., verbal tools for 
referring to people, objects, and actions. Intonation is used by the child to 
indicate the force of his utterance, i,e., what he wishes to be accomplished by 
the production of the single word. Dore includes gesture as part of the 
nonlinguistic behavior that contributes to determining the force of an 
utterance. Unlike VDG, Dore does not formally include gesture in analyses of 
single-word utterances: "from a speech act point of view, contextual features 
[including gestures] and the child's understanding of the world are denied 
structural status. In this way a clear distinction is drawn between knowledge 
of language and knowledge of the world, and this helps prevent basing claims 
about the former on data about the latter" (p. 34). 
The issue here then is whether one wants to consider gestural data to be 
linguistic data in a model of child language development. The whole question 
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is further complicated by VDG's alternation between linguistic competence 
and communicative competence. If his argument is that a gestural system is 
part of the child's communicative competence, then his data support such a 
claim since gestures contribute to communicating different speech functions. 
If on the other hand he is proposing that gestures are part of the child's 
linguistic system as he seems to in Chapter VI, then the data do not support 
his claim. 
VDG's final criticism of One Word at a Time is the distinction Bloom 
draws between semantics and cognition. He argues for a contrast instead 
between "cognition and semantics on the one hand and syntax (or realiza- 
tion) on the other" (p. 196). This cognitive semantic knowledge is "the 
knowledge of the speaker inasfar as it is involved in the content of the 
message" (p. 5). He therefore combines both what the speaker knows about 
the world and knowledge of meaning relations as expressed by words and 
their relations. His view is related to that of Parisi (1971): "By semantic 
structure we mean a cognitive structure which is constructed with the intent 
to communicate it. Therefore semantic structures are a subclass of cognitive 
structures" (p. 102). 
There are substantial arguments on both sides of the issue regarding the 
relationship between cognition and semantic representation. It is argued here 
that a distinction ought to be maintained between the two even if there is 
overlap at points. One must be able to distinguish between knowledge the 
child has about people, events, and objects and their relations and the means 
he has for encoding this information linguistically. The problem with equating 
semantics with cognition is the failure to recognize that there exist in every 
culture cognitive discriminations that are not encoded linguistically (Bower- 
man, 1976). The complex Russian system of verbs of motion discriminates 
between round trips and trips with stops; this information is encoded in 
different verbal forms in Russian and is absent in English, although speakers 
of English are clearly able to discriminate between such events. 
The preceding discussion covers much of the material presented in 
Chapters VI-VIII. However, VDG also addresses stress placement and the form 
of output in one- and two-word utterances in Chapters VIII and IX. He argues 
that one- and two-word utterances are the result of output constraints under 
which the child operates. The child produces a single-word utterance by 
selecting the rightmost element in the logical tree structure; a two-word 
utterance is the result of the child's selecting the two rightmost elements of 
the logical tree structure. Turning to stress assignment in two-word and 
multiword utterances, VDG proposes a model that accounts for this phe- 
nomenon in terms of stress placement and the juxtaposition of old and new 
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information in the adult input. An analysis of these arguments would require 
detailed discussion of VDG's theory of stress assignment and ellipsis presented 
in Part I of CC and is therefore beyond the stated scope of this review. 
A highlight of CC is VDG's treatment of pragmatic errors in his son's 
early speech productions (Chapter X). For the sake of simplicity, the English 
glosses provided by VDG will be presented here to illustrate the phenomena. 
Mark, his son, produced the utterances under A with the apparent meanings 
under B. 
A 
1 a. I have to sit down. 
2a. I don't get anything else. 
3a. A m  I just doing this? 
B 
lb. I want to sit down. 
2b. I don't want anything else. 
3b. Can I just do this? 
The author explains these errors as too literal adaptations of the adult 
input sentences. Hence, la seems to be derived from (adapted from) the adult 
sentence lc You must sit down in that it "serves the same ultimate 
effect"-Mark will sit down (p. 237). Likewise, 2a is the adaptation of 2c You 
don't get anything else and 3a of 3c Will you just do this? Apparently Mark 
had encoded the basic pragmatic function he wanted to express but had not 
yet determined "whether it was the speaker or the addressee who desired the 
ultimate effect represented in the propositional structure" (p. 237). 
Similar speaker-addressee errors were found in Mark's use of please for 
thank you, I for you, and yours for mine. In each case, Mark had identified 
the correct set of words used in a particular pragmatic situation without 
having worked out the details of which form was associated with the speaker 
and which with the hearer. Further data on pragmatic errors in child language 
should suggest what the essential properties of rules of  language use might be. 
A few observations on the technical quality of CC must be included. 
The volume suffers from poor editing; it was not rare to find sentences like 
the following: 
In my Early child grammars: an evaluation I argued that analysing child 
language data by writing grammars fails. One reason this fails is that, 
because it neglects the fact that in linguistics grammars are written to make 
linguistic intuitions explicit, rather than to describe the products of 
linguistic abilities, a mismatch arises between the purpose of grammars in 
linguistics in its narrow sense and the use of child grammars in the field of 
developmental psycholinguistics, which latter are designed to account for 
the child's productions. (p. 1) 
CC was produced by offset reproduction, a practical and inexpensive 
means of avoiding production delays. While it is likely that more publishers 
and authors will choose this method of printing, it appears to have con- 
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tributed to technical problems in the volume. For example, typos were 
occasionally corrected in handwriting and letters, words, and phrases some- 
times rose above the type line. Occasionally typos led to my inability to 
decipher the meaning of  a sentence. Finally, references were occasionally left 
out o f  the bibliography: for example, "O'Donnel l"  and "Van Der Geest et  al. 
(1974)." 
Despite these infelicities, it is clear that a tremendous amount o f  
thought went into developing the ideas presented in CC. Certain issues raised 
by VDG such as the role of  nonverbal behavior in models of  communicative 
competence deserve further consideration in future research (see Keller-Cohen 
et al.,  1977). Subsequent investigations by Brunet (1974/1975), Bates 
et al. (1975), and Dore (1975), among others, have contributed to increasing 
our understanding of  what the child can be said to know about the process o f  
communication during the earliest stages o f  development. We must ultimately 
come to grips with systematically integrating both the verbal and nonverbal 
features of  the child's behavior into a theory of  the child's communicative 
competence. Van Der Geest's work is a worthy introduction. 
REFERENCES 
Antinucci, F., and Parisi, D. (1973). Early language acquisition: A model and some data. 
In Ferguson, C., and Slobin, D. (eds.), Studies o f  Child Language Development, Holt, 
Rinehart and Winston, New York, pp. 607-619. 
Bates, E., Benigni, L., Bretherton, I., Camaioni, L., and Volterra, V. (1975). From 
gesture to the first word: On cognitive and social prerequisites. Unpublished manu- 
script, Department of Psychology, University of Colorado. 
Bever, T. (1970). The cognitive basis for linguistic structure. Irl Hayes, J. R. (ed.), 
Cognition and the Development o f  Language, Wiley, New York, pp. 279-352. 
Bowerman, M. (1973a). Early Syntactic Development: A Cross-linguistic Study wit.~ 
Special Reference to Finnish, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Bowerman, M. (1973b). Structural relationships in children's utterances: Syntactic or 
semantic? In Moore, T. E. (ed.), Cognitive Development and the Acquisition o f  
Language, Academic Press, New York, pp. 197-213. 
Bowerman, M. (i976). Semantics factors in the acquisition of rtdes for word use and 
sentence construction. In Morehead, D., and Morehead, A. (eds.), Directions in 
Normal and Deficient Child Language, University Park Press, Baltimore. 
Bloom, L. (1973). One Word at a Time: The Use o f  Single Words Before Syntax, 
Mouton, The Hague. 
Bruner, J. (1974/1975). From communication to language-A psychological perspective. 
Cognition 3(3):255-287. 
Clark, E. V. (1971). On the acquisition of the meaning of before and after. J. Verb. 
Learn. Verb. Behav. 10:266-275. 
Clark, E. V. (1973). Non-linguistic strategies and the acquisition of word meanings. 
Cognition 2(2): 161-182. 
278 Book Reviews 
Clark, E. V. (1976). Knowledge, context and strategy in the acquisition of meaning. In 
Dato, D. (ed.), "Proceedings of the 26th Ammal Georgetown University Round 
Table," Developmental Psycholinguistics: Theory and Applications, Georgetown Uni- 
versity Press, Washington, D.C. 
Dote, J. (1975). Holophrases, speech acts and language universals. J. Child Lang. 
2(1):21-40. 
Hymes, D. (1972). On communicative competence, 1966. Reprinted in Pride, J. B., and 
Holmes, J. (eds.), Soeiolinguistics: Selected Readings, Penguin, Baltimore, pp. 
268-293. 
Hymes, D. (1974). Foundations in Sociolinguistics, University of Pennsylvania Press, 
Philadelphia. 
Ingram, D. (1971). Transitivity in child language. Language 47:888-910. 
Keller-Cohen, D. (1974). The expression of time in language acquisition. Paper presented 
at the 48th Annual Meeting of the Linguistic Society of America, New York, 
D~cember. 
Keller-Cohen, D., Chalmer, K. C., and Remler, J. E. (1977). The acquisition of discourse 
negation in the non-native child. In Keenan, E. O. (ed.), Studies in Developmental 
Pragmatics, Academic Press, New York. 
Parisi, D. (1974). What is behind child utterances? J. Child Lang. 1(1):97-105. 
Deborah Keller-Cohen 
Department of Linguistics 
University of Michigan 
Ann Arbor, Michigan 
